RETURN FROM THE SUMMIT. Home from summit talks in Moscow and visits to Iran and Poland, President and Mrs. Richard Nixon arrived at Andrews AFB, Maryland, June 1 and were immediately flown by helicopter to the Capitol, where Congress met in a joint night session to hear the President report on his journey. In his nationally televised appearance, Mr. Nixon said that he had no new announcements to make but that he wanted to amplify the announcements already made during his Moscow visits. Primarily, he referred to two basic documents: (1) Joint U.S.-Soviet Communiques; (2) Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The latter document (published in its entirety on page 5) covers the spirit and the thrust of the historic Moscow summit conference. The first document (also reported verbatim, beginning on page 6) represents a point-by-point summary of agreements signed or reached in Moscow, ranging from Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), to Incidents at Sea, to U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space. (Associated Press Photo)

COMMANDERS DIGEST

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • WASHINGTON, D.C.

Vol. 12, No. 6 **June 15, 1972**

RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING: The C-5 Galaxy

"Ask The Man Who Owns One"

C-5: Supporting The Nation's Military Strategy

By General Jack J. Catton, USAF
Commander, Military Airlift Command

About 30 years ago, when the American public, bombarded on all sides by conflicting advertising claims, was considering buying an expensive automobile, they were encouraged to "ask the man who owns one." The inference was that no one knew better than the operator—the man who used the machine, day-in and day-out—if it did the job. We have a similar circumstance today. The American people have purchased the C-5 machine and have been told a great deal about it. There is a lot of confusion—many different opinions, pro and con—and it's hard for the public to separate fact from fiction concerning the C-5. So perhaps this is a good time to ask the man who owns them—or at least operates them for the Air Force and the Department of Defense—for the American public.

Gen. Catton made these remarks May 25, 1972, before the Aviation/Space Writers Association at John F. Kennedy airport in New York City. To emphasize his remarks he invited the writers aboard a parked C-5 so that he could illustrate as well as describe.

Before I give you that opportunity to "ask the operator," I want you all to realize the C-5 was developed to do a particular job in support of this Nation's military strategy. I mention this simply because that statement of fact gives us some key ideas to consider—ideas such as the C-5 itself, its procurement, the job it does, and the strategy it supports.

First, the airplane. The C-5 is unique. I'm sure you're all impressed with its size. I suppose you've already heard the obvious comparisons: sit it on a football field with its tail on the goal line and its nose is inside the other twenty; its wings

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GALAXY

(Continued from Page 1)

are way beyond both benches. Or, its tail is six stories high.

175,000 Pound Payload

However, you might not know that we're operating the airplane daily at over 712,000 pounds gross weight, with a payload of 175,000 pounds. When we have to—and the past few weeks we've had to—we go to 728,000, with just under 200,000 pounds of payload. The airplane gives us great capability—unique to the military needs we have.

For example, you've heard a lot about our gear problems—we have a complicated gear system—but it allows us to decouple our fleet from the JFK-type, sophisticated air terminals which might not be available when and where we need them [and it] permits very rapid on- and off-loading.

We cruise at .767 Mach—which is moving out—but still somewhat slower than our civilian counterparts. But we traded off those few knots of speed for the shorter on-load/off-load times. To get the drive-on/drive-off capability which helps make this a combat airplane, we had to go to the high lift rather than the high speed position on the wing—but shortened ground times are important to us in a combat situation.

Record Turnaround Time

Two weeks ago, the C-5 recorded ground times of 32, 30 and 27 minutes at DaNang. [Do] you know what they were carrying? M-41 tanks—and those times I gave you were from touchdown to takeoff. There—on the ground—when we are vulnerable and the cargo is vulnerable—is where and when we need the speed most—a design factor peculiar to our basic role of combat airlift.

The fact that we're carrying vehicles on those missions sets this airplane apart from our commercial counterparts whose aircraft are stressed for palletized loads. We have the ability to airdrop from this aircraft. Although we've never used that particular strategy in combat, we have tested it with some very plausible scenarios—like Freedom Vault, where we flew troops and equipment from stateside bases to Korea and airdropped them.

General Jack J. Catton, USAF

With the current pressure toward more stateside basing of our forces, the ability to rapidly move the troops from home to battlefield becomes increasingly important—whether they be airdropped or air landed in the assault.

I could go on and on with the unique features of the aircraft, but I hope you understand—the primary need this airplane was designed to meet is the outsized cargo requirements—and we can meet them. We can move every piece of equipment in an Army infantry division in this airplane—right up to the M-60 main battle tank—and we can maintain combat integrity by taking the personnel associated right along with the equipment. This airplane is one of a kind—nothing in the air can match it—and, teamed with the C-141, we can deliver balanced integral air and ground fighting forces anywhere in the world they are needed.

Not too long ago, when I spoke to one of our professional military schools, I was asked whether in hindsight I'd rather have had the 747 freighter. I had to answer "no," just because of the features I just mentioned.

Truck-bed High

The 747 doesn't have the drive-on/drive-off capability. It needs sophisticated runways and special handling equipment, while the C-5 is truck-bed high to begin with and can kneel. The 747 can't airdrop—it can't lift anything the C-141 can't. What it all boils down to is [this:]—the C-5 is different from every other kind of aircraft because it was designed to do a particular military job. It required—and has—characteristics that no civil carrier would find a market for. And that brings me back to my framework statement—"The C-5 was developed for a special job in support of this Nation's military strategy."

Procurement Problems

Having talked about the airplane itself, let me address its acquisition just briefly. We're all aware of the many procurement problems which have been aired relative to the C-5. But it's been more than seven years since the Department of Defense chose the "total package procurement" method of doing business for this aircraft. Still we hear about cost overruns, the financial position of the prime contractor, mismanagement of contracts [and] the Lockheed loan guarantee. How or why these problems exist has a multitude of answers—many of which depend upon one's point of view. Much of it is Monday-morning quarterbacking.

Let me emphasize, however, that today I'm talking as an operator—and none of these problems associated with the C-5 can overshadow the true accomplishments of performance and flexibility offered by this weapons system.

Too often, the negative aspects of the aircraft's performance are stressed. I think this is because one of the least understood facts of the C-5 is that it was purchased under a concurrent testing and production concept. Many of the alleged deficiencies of the C-5 are a result of operational aircraft being delivered while development testing was still in progress. Two years ago, when we received our first operational aircraft, testing was barely 50 percent complete. Today, testing is roughly 95 percent complete. The contractor has completed all development tests and is continuing

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COMMANDERS DIGEST

A publication of the Department of Defense intended to provide official information to commanders and key personnel on matters related to Defense policies and interests, and to create better understanding and teamwork within the Department of Defense.

Published weekly by the American Forces Press Service, 1117 N. 19th St., Arlington, Va. 22209, a unified activity of the Office of Information for the Armed Forces, OASD (M&RA). **Reproduction of content is authorized.**

RECIPIENTS OF HIGHEST DOD CIVILIAN AWARDS. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, left, reflects his approval and praise following his personal presentation of Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Awards to eight career employes in an annual ceremony at the Pentagon June 1. Receiving the Department's highest civilian awards were, from left to right, Marvin Lasky, Navy; Thomas H. Wilkenson, Army; David O. Cooke, DoD; Robert H. Willey, Navy; Mrs. Dorothe K. Matlack, Army; Joe C. Jones, Air Force; and Ernest C. Simpson, Air Force. Melvin H. Baker, a Marine Corps recipient, is not shown in the photo.
(Official DoD Photo by Frank Hall)

ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

June 1 Through August 31, 1972

Army, Marine Corps Slate Combat Arms Enlistment Bonus Test

The Army and Marine Corps will test payment of a bonus of $1,500 for a four-year enlistment in one of the designated ground combat arms military occupational specialties (MOS) as another manpower stabilization step toward President Nixon's goal of zero draft calls by July 1, 1973.

The combat arms enlistment bonus will be offered during a 90-day test period—June 1 through Aug. 31, 1972. The designated ground combat arms MOS are infantry, armor and field artillery for the Army, and infantry, field artillery, and tank and amphibian tractor in the Marine Corps.

It is expected that the combat arms enlistment bonus will cost an estimated $16 million, based on the Army accepting up to 7,500 enlistees and the Marine Corps 3,300 enlistees in the designated military occupational specialties.

The enlistment bonus will be payable after completion of training and award of a designated combat arms MOS.

The bonus is intended primarily for initial enlistees. However, some prior service enlistees may qualify if they have not previously received or are not currently entitled to a reenlistment bonus. Individuals who have received their draft notice may enlist for the bonus up to 10 days prior to induction.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, speaking about the bonus test, said: "In moving toward President Nixon's goal of an all-volunteer armed force by July 1, 1973, we must improve manpower stability and long-term retention, particularly in the combat arms specialties. I believe one step in stabilizing the force may be achieved by offering the $1,500 ground combat arms bonus to individuals accepting four-year enlistments, and I have authorized a test program to assess this."

After the 90-day test of the ground combat arms enlistment bonus, a review of its effectiveness will be made by manpower officials.

35,000 July-December Draft Call Announced

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird announced May 13 a draft call of 35,000 men for July-December 1972, bringing the total request to Selective Service for 1972 to 50,000 inductees.

In March, the Defense Department requested a total of 15,000 men for April-June 1972.

Secretary Laird said this year's draft call of 50,000—the lowest in any calendar year since the draft law was renewed in 1948—is another indication of the Administration's desire to reach Zero Draft by July 1, 1973.

Following are draft calls in recent years by the Department of Defense and inductions by Selective Service:

Year	Request	Inductions
1971	98,000	94,092
1970	163,500	169,182
1969	289,900	288,753
1968	299,000	290,149
1967	218,700	229,056
1966	364,700	383,626
1965	233,200	226,689
1964	107,500	111,412
1963	119,000	120,362

INTERNATIONAL POLICY FEATURE: Chemical/Biological Warfare

Of Special Concern to the United States

Efforts to Ban CBW Spearheaded by U.S.

What has the United States done about the problems of Chemical and Biological Warfare?

U.S. Policy

The United States has made the problems of chemical and biological warfare one of its special concerns. Since 1969, the United States has:

—Resubmitted the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning use in war of poisonous or other gases to the Senate;

—Renounced the first use of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons;

—Renounced **any** use of biological and toxin weapons;

—Begun destroying its biological weapons stockpiles in July 1971; and

—Begun converting biological research and production facilities into health research centers.

BW Treaty

In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union at the Geneva Conference of the U.N. Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in 1971, tabled parallel drafts of a convention for the prohibition of biological warfare. The final CCD-approved convention, adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 16, 1971, by a vote of 110-1, will be opened for signature simultaneously at Washington, London, and Moscow at an early date.

The convention:

—Declares that parties to the convention have "determined for the sake of all mankind to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons";

—Fully safeguards and protects the validity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol;

—Contains a firm commitment regarding continued negotiations on effective prohibition of chemical weapons (e.g., each country undertakes to "continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement" on effective measures to prohibit, produce, stockpile, and destroy chemical agents for weapons purposes); and

—Provides for international cooperation in the peaceful applications of bacteriology and biology.

Importance of Protocol Ratification

There are now 96 parties to the Geneva Protocol, 35 of which have ratified it or acceded to it with reservations. Most of the reserving States assert that the Protocol is binding on them only with respect to other parties to the Protocol, and that it limits the prohibitions of poison gases to no first use. Unlike the other major powers, the United States would not reserve the right to use bacteriological warfare in retaliation against any country, whether or not such a country is a party to the Protocol. U.S. ratification would be an important step in advancing President Nixon's policy in this area.

It would:

—Strengthen the legal prohibitions against the use in war of chemical and biological weapons and toxins;

—Constitute a positive movement toward arms control and a direct response to U.N. Assembly resolutions urging all members to become parties to the Protocol;

—Reinforce U.S. policy statements on no first use of such agents; and

—Strengthen the U.S. position in developing initiatives for future arms control measures in that area.

Chemical Warfare

The United States reserves the right to retaliatory use of chemical warfare. Many of the parties to the 1925 Protocol, including France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Japan, also reserve that right.

Herbicides, Riot-Control Agents

It is the United States' understanding of the 1925 Protocol that it does not prohibit the use in war of chemical herbicides and riot-control agents. The key words of the Protocol—the phrase, "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases" —are far from clear in resolving whether it was intended to apply to all other gases. It is the United States' view that the Protocol was not intended to cover the use of riot-control agents (such as tear gas) which are generally used for domestic law-enforcement purposes and have limited, short-term effects.

Based on: Department of State GIST, Disarmament: CBW, dated January 1972.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Guided by their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and by a desire to strengthen peaceful relations with each other and to place these relations on the firmest possible basis,

Aware of the need to make every effort to remove the threat of war and to create conditions which promote the reduction of tensions in the world and the strengthening of universal security and international cooperation,

Believing that the improvement of US-Soviet relations and their mutually advantageous development in such areas as economics, science and culture, will meet these objectives and contribute to better mutual understanding and business-like cooperation, without in any way prejudicing the interests of third countries,

Conscious that these objectives reflect the interests of the peoples of both countries,

Have agreed as follows:

First. They will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Differences in ideology and in the social systems of the USA and the USSR are not obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage.

Second. The USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. They will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. Discussions and negotiations on outstanding issues will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit.

Both Sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives. The prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening peaceful relations between the USA and the USSR are the recognition of the security interests of the Parties based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat of force.

Third. The USA and the USSR have a special responsibility, as do other countries which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions. Accordingly, they will seek to promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace and security and will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs.

Fourth. The USA and the USSR intend to widen the juridical basis of their mutual relations and to exert the necessary efforts so that bilateral agreements which they have concluded and multilateral treaties and agreements to which they are jointly parties are faithfully implemented.

Fifth. The USA and the USSR reaffirm their readiness to continue the practice of exchanging views on problems of mutual interest and, when necessary, to conduct such exchanges at the highest level, including meetings between leaders of the two countries.

The two governments welcome and will facilitate an increase in productive contacts between representatives of the legislative bodies of the two countries.

Sixth. The Parties will continue their efforts to limit armaments on a bilateral as well as on a multilateral basis. They will continue to make special efforts to limit strategic armaments. Whenever possible, they will conclude concrete agreements aimed at achieving these purposes.

The USA and the USSR regard as the ultimate objective of their efforts the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of an effective system of international security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Seventh. The USA and the USSR regard commercial and economic ties as an important and necessary element in the strengthening of their bilateral relations and thus will actively promote the growth of such ties. They will facilitate cooperation between the relevant organizations and enterprises of the two countries and the conclusion of appropriate agreements and contracts, including long-term ones.

The two countries will contribute to the improvement of maritime and air communications between them.

Eighth. The two sides consider it timely and useful to develop mutual contacts and cooperation in the fields of science and technology. Where suitable, the USA and the USSR will conclude appropriate agreements dealing with concrete cooperation in these fields.

Ninth. The two sides reaffirm their intention to deepen cultural ties with one another and to encourage fuller familiarization with each other's cultural values. They will promote improved conditions for cultural exchanges and tourism.

Tenth. The USA and the USSR will seek to ensure that their ties and cooperation in all the above-mentioned fields and in any others in their mutual interest are built on a firm and long-term basis. To give a permanent character to these efforts, they will establish in all fields where this is feasible joint commissions or other joint bodies.

Eleventh. The USA and the USSR make no claim for themselves and would not recognize the claims of anyone else to any special rights or advantages in world affairs. They recognize the sovereign equality of all states.

The Development of US-Soviet relations is not directed against third countries and their interests.

Twelfth. The basic principles set forth in this document do not affect any obligations with respect to other countries earlier assumed by the USA and the USSR.

Moscow, May 29, 1972

For the United States of America
RICHARD NIXON
President of the United States
of America

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
LEONID I. BREZHNEV
General Secretary of the
Central Committee, CPSU

JOINT U.S.—SOVIET COMMUNIQUE

By mutual agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the President of the United States and Mrs. Richard Nixon paid an official visit to the Soviet Union from May 22 to May 30, 1972. The President was accompanied by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, and other American officials. During his stay in the USSR President Nixon visited, in addition to Moscow, the cities of Leningrad and Kiev.

President Nixon and L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR conducted talks on fundamental problems of American-Soviet relations and the current international situation.

Also taking part in the conversations were:

On the American side: William P. Rogers, Secretary of State; Jacob D. Beam, American Ambassador to the USSR; Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Peter M. Flanigan, Assistant to the President; and Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

On the Soviet side: A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; N. S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade; V. V. Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; A. F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA; A. M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU; G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

The discussions covered a wide range of questions of mutual interest and were frank and thorough. They defined more precisely those areas where there are prospects for developing greater cooperation between the two countries, as well as those areas where the positions of the two Sides are different.

I. BILATERAL RELATIONS

Guided by the desire to place US-Soviet relations on a more stable and constructive foundation, and mindful of their responsibilities for maintaining world peace and for facilitating the relaxation of international tension, the two Sides adopted a document entitled: "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," signed on behalf of the US by President Nixon and on behalf of the USSR by General Secretary Brezhnev.

Both Sides are convinced that the provisions of that document open new possibilities for the development of peaceful relations and mutually beneficial cooperation between the USA and the USSR.

Having considered various areas of bilateral US-Soviet relations, the two Sides agreed that an improvement of relations is possible and desirable. They expressed their firm intention to act in accordance with the provisions set forth in the above-mentioned document.

As a result of progress made in negotiations which preceded the summit meeting, and in the course of the meeting itself, a number of significant agreements were reached. This will intensify bilateral cooperation in areas of common concern as well as in areas relevant to the cause of peace and international cooperation.

Limitation of Strategic Armaments

The two Sides gave primary attention to the problem of reducing the danger of nuclear war. They believe that curbing the competition in strategic arms will make a significant and tangible contribution to this cause.

The two Sides attach great importance to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms concluded between them.

These agreements, which were concluded as a result of the negotiations in Moscow, constitute a major step towards curbing and ultimately ending the arms race.

They are a concrete expression of the intention of the two Sides to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of confidence between states, as well as to carry out the obligations assumed by them in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Article VI). Both Sides are convinced that the achievement of the above agreements is a practical step towards saving mankind from the threat of the outbreak of nuclear war. Accordingly, it corresponds to the vital interests of the American and Soviet peoples as well as to the vital interests of all other peoples.

The two Sides intend to continue active negotiations for the limitation of strategic offensive arms and to conduct them in a spirit of goodwill, respect for each other's legitimate interests and observance of the principle of equal security.

Both Sides are also convinced that the agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the USA and the USSR, signed in Washington on September 30, 1971, serves the interests not only of the Soviet and American peoples, but of all mankind.

Commercial and Economic Relations

Both Sides agreed on measures designed to establish more favorable conditions for developing commercial and other economic ties between the USA and the USSR. The two Sides agree that realistic conditions exist for increasing economic ties. These ties should develop on the basis of mutual benefit and in accordance with generally accepted international practice.

Believing that these aims would be served by conclusion of a trade agreement between the USA and the USSR, the two Sides decided to complete in the near future the work necessary to conclude such an agreement. They agreed on the desirability of credit arrangements to develop mutual trade and of early efforts to resolve other financial and economic issues. It was agreed that a lend-lease settlement will be negotiated concurrently with a trade agreement.

In the interests of broadening and facilitating commercial ties between the two countries, and to work out specific arrangements, the two Sides decided to create a US-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission. Its first meeting will be held in Moscow in the summer of 1972.

Each Side will help promote the establishment of effective

working arrangements between organizations and firms of both countries and encouraging the conclusion of long-term contracts.

Maritime Matters: Incidents at Sea

The two Sides agreed to continue the negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement on maritime and related matters. They believe that such an agreement would mark a positive step in facilitating the expansion of commerce between the United States and the Soviet Union.

An Agreement was concluded between the two Sides on measures to prevent incidents at sea and in air space over it between vessels and aircraft of the US and Soviet Navies. By providing agreed procedures for ships and aircraft of the two navies operating in close proximity, this agreement will diminish the chances of dangerous accidents.

Cooperation in Science and Technology

It was recognized that the cooperation now underway in areas such as atomic energy research, space research, health and other fields benefits both nations and has contributed positively to their over-all relations. It was agreed that increased scientific and technical cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit and shared effort for common goals is in the interest of both nations and would contribute to a further improvement in their bilateral relations. For these purposes the two Sides signed an agreement for cooperation in the fields of science and technology. A US-Soviet Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation will be created for identifying and establishing cooperative programs.

Cooperation in Space

Having in mind the role played by the US and the USSR in the peaceful exploration of outer space, both Sides emphasized the importance of further bilateral cooperation in this sphere. In order to increase the safety of man's flights in outer space and the future prospects of joint scientific experiments, the two Sides agreed to make suitable arrangements to permit the docking of American and Soviet spacecraft and stations. The first joint docking experiment of the two countries' piloted spacecraft, with visits by astronauts and cosmonauts to each other's spacecraft, is contemplated for 1975. The planning and implementation of this flight will be carried out by the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the USSR Academy of Sciences, according to principles and procedures developed through mutual consultations.

Cooperation in the Field of Health

The two Sides concluded an agreement on health cooperation which marks a fruitful beginning of sharing knowledge about, and collaborative attacks on, the common enemies, disease and disability. The initial research efforts of the program will concentrate on health problems important to the whole world—cancer, heart diseases, and the environmental health sciences. This cooperation subsequently will be broadened to include other health problems of mutual interest. The two Sides pledged their full support for the health cooperation program and agreed to continue the active participation of the two governments in the work of international organizations in the health field.

Environmental Cooperation

The two Sides agreed to initiate a program of cooperation in the protection and enhancement of man's environment. Through joint research and joint measures, the United States and the USSR hope to contribute to the preservation of a healthful environment in their countries and throughout the world. Under the new agreement on environmental cooperation there will be consultations in the near future in Moscow on specific cooperative projects.

Exchanges in the Fields of Science, Technology, Education and Culture

Both Sides note the importance of the Agreement on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Education, Cultural, and Other Fields in 1972-1973, signed in Moscow on April 11, 1972. Continuation and expansion of bilateral exchanges in these fields will lead to better understanding and help improve the general state of relations between the two countries. Within the broad framework provided by this Agreement the two Sides have agreed to expand the areas of cooperation, as reflected in new agreements concerning space, health, the environment, and science and technology.

The US side, noting the existence of an extensive program of English language instruction in the Soviet Union, indicated its intention to encourage Russian language programs in the United States.

II. INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Europe

In the course of the discussions on the international situation, both Sides took note of favorable developments in the relaxation of tensions in Europe.

Recognizing the importance to world peace of developments in Europe, where both World Wars originated, and mindful of the responsibilities and commitments which they share with other powers under appropriate agreements, the USA and the USSR intend to make further efforts to ensure a peaceful future for Europe, free of tensions, crises and conflicts.

They agree that the territorial integrity of all states in Europe should be respected.

Both Sides view the September 3, 1971 Quadripartite Agreement relating to the Western Sectors of Berlin as a good example of fruitful cooperation between the states concerned, including the USA and the USSR. The two Sides believe that the implementation of that agreement in the near future, along with other steps, will further improve the European situation and contribute to the necessary trust among states.

Both Sides welcomed the treaty between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany signed on August 12, 1970. They noted the significance of the provisions of this treaty as well as of other recent agreements in contributing to confidence and cooperation among the European states.

The USA and the USSR are prepared to make appropriate contributions to the positive trends on the European continent toward a genuine detente and the development of relations of peaceful cooperation among states in Europe on the basis of the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs, sovereign equality, independence and renunciation of the use or threat of force.

The US and the USSR are in accord that multilateral consultations looking toward a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe could begin after the signature of the Final

Quadripartite Protocol of the Agreement of September 3, 1971. The two governments agree that the conference should be carefully prepared in order that it may concretely consider specific problems of security and cooperation and thus contribute to the progressive reduction of the underlying causes of tension in Europe. This conference should be convened at a time to be agreed by the countries concerned, but without undue delay.

Both Sides believe that the goal of ensuring stability and security in Europe would be served by a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments, first of all in Central Europe. Any agreement on this question should not diminish the security of any of the Sides. Appropriate agreement should be reached as soon as practicable between the states concerned on the procedures for negotiations on this subject in a special forum.

The Middle East

The two Sides set out their positions on this question. They reaffirm their support for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242.

Noting the significance of constructive cooperation of the parties concerned with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Ambassador Jarring, the US and the USSR confirm their desire to contribute to his mission's success and also declare their readiness to play their part in bringing about a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. In the view of the US and the USSR, the achievement of such a settlement would open prospects for the normalization of the Middle East situation and would permit, in particular, consideration of further steps to bring about a military relaxation in that area.

Indochina

Each Side set forth its respective standpoint with regard to the continuing war in Vietnam and the situation in the area of Indochina as a whole.

The US side emphasized the need to bring an end to the military conflict as soon as possible and reaffirmed its commitment to the principle that the political future of South Vietnam should be left for the South Vietnamese people to decide for themselves, free from outside interference.

The US side explained its view that the quickest and most effective way to attain the above-mentioned objectives is through negotiations leading to the return of all Americans held captive in the region, the implementation of an internationally supervised Indochina-wide ceasefire and the subsequent withdrawal of all American forces stationed in South Vietnam within four months, leaving the political questions to be resolved by the Indochinese peoples themselves.

The United States reiterated its willingness to enter into serious negotiations with the North Vietnamese Side to settle the war in Indochina on a basis just to all.

The Soviet side stressed its solidarity with the just struggle of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia for their freedom, independence and social progress. Firmly supporting the proposals of the DRV and the Republic of South Vietnam, which provide a realistic and constructive basis for settling the Vietnam problem, the Soviet Union stands for a cessation of bombings of the DRV, for a complete and unequivocal withdrawal of the troops of the USA and its allies from South Vietnam, so that the peoples of Indochina would have the possibility to determine for themselves their fate without any outside interference.

Disarmament Issues

The two Sides expressed their positions on arms limitation and disarmament issues.

The two Sides note that in recent years their joint and parallel actions have facilitated the working out and conclusion of treaties which curb the arms race or ban some of the most dangerous types of weapons. They note further that these treaties were welcomed by a large majority of the states in the world, which became parties to them.

Both sides regard the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction, as an essential disarmament measure. Along with Great Britain, they are the depositories for the Convention which was recently opened for signature by all states. The USA and the USSR will continue their efforts to reach an international agreement regarding chemical weapons.

The USA and the USSR, proceeding from the need to take into account the security interests of both countries on the basis of the principle of equality, and without prejudice to the security interests of third countries, will actively participate in negotiations aimed at working out new measures designed to curb and end the arms race. The ultimate purpose is general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under strict international control. A world disarmament conference could play a role in this process at an appropriate time.

Strengthening the United Nations

Both Sides will strive to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations on the basis of strict observance of the UN Charter. They regard the United Nations as an instrument for maintaining world peace and security, discouraging conflicts, and developing international cooperation. Accordingly, they will do their best to support United Nations efforts in the interests of international peace.

Both Sides emphasized that agreements and understandings reached in the negotiations in Moscow, as well as the contents and nature of these negotiations, are not in any way directed against any other country. Both Sides proceed from the recognition of the role, the responsibility and the prerogatives of other interested states, existing international obligations and agreements, and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter.

Both Sides believe that positive results were accomplished in the course of the talks at the highest level. These results indicate that despite the differences between the USA and the USSR in social systems, ideologies, and policy principles, it is possible to develop mutually advantageous cooperation between the peoples of both countries, in the interests of strengthening peace and international security.

Both Sides expressed the desire to continue close contact on a number of issues that were under discussion. They agreed that regular consultations on questions of mutual interest, including meetings at the highest level, would be useful.

In expressing his appreciation for the hospitality accorded him in the Soviet Union, President Nixon invited General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman N. V. Podgorny, and Chairman A. N. Kosygin to visit the United States at a mutually convenient time. This invitation was accepted.

Secretary Morton Says:

Interior Dept. Careers Available for Ex-Servicemen

The Department of Interior is very much concerned about the environment —and has been, long before ecology became a household word.

Secretary of Interior Rogers C. B. Morton, in a recent "Directions 72" panel discussion videotape show in Washington aired over American Forces Television outlets worldwide, pointed out that " . . . We have a responsibility to the environment in connection with the development of water, in connection with the development of power, both electric power and power made from natural fuels, such as coal and oil and gas. . . ."

Its concern naturally follows the mission of the Interior Department in dealing with such vital functions as Indian Affairs, the territories, reclamation or water development for the western states, energy, minerals and mining, and fish, wildlife and national parks.

There are presently eight rivers and river areas under the Department of Interior's Wild and Scenic River program; 27 other areas are under study. They, together with a national system of trails, are being used by more and more people each year.

The Department of Interior has also turned over almost a hundred sites—some of which are former military installations—to local governments for the establishment of neighborhood parks.

Indian Affairs

About one-fourth of the Interior Department's entire budget is devoted to the Bureau of Indian Affairs to provide Indians with an imaginative program that they can adopt. The Department's goal is to have the Nation's 30 Indian tribes entirely self-determined so that they will have the choice of how they want to fit into the society of the future.

Career Opportunities

The Department of Interior, Secretary Morton revealed, is " . . . probably the most exciting government agency today, in terms of people's relationship to their environment. And the opportunities in many of our bureaus are becoming very apparent. . . . "

Careers are available, he explained, in the Department for engineers, geologists, and others who like to work out of doors. Not every applicant for a position needs to be fully trained, however. There are opportunities to learn skills in the National Park Service, in the Bureau of Mines, in geological survey, and in the Bureau of Reclamation, to mention a few.

As to the role of the returning military veteran in the new society, the Secretary predicted," . . . we feel that they will be a great link between our Department and the future because they are going to be aware of these environmental difficulties and problems that we have had in the past. . . . "

"Strategic airlift can give us the means to find the best mix of overseas garrisons . . . enabling us to reduce our overseas forces to a level we can better support—and still meet our commitments."

GALAXY

(Continued from Page 2)

the fatigue test which will determine aircraft service life.

We're finding some problems such as structural difficulties. You're all familiar with the pylon problem—well, that's fixed. We've had some problems with kneeling—and we're fixing them. We may well expect to have other problems too, for, after all, the C-5 is a substantial jump in the state of the art. And, when we have them, we'll fix them.

About one year of Air Force tests remain for the avionics systems and, as these systems become qualified, we—the operators—will perform small-scale suitability tests.

In spite of the problems, I hope you understand we have—and will continue—to perform the mission, right along with our testing. It simply means that sometimes the crews must operate certain systems manually rather than being able to rely on automatic features.

Outsized Loads

But one thing all this testing has proven—the C-5 *will* fulfill the strategic airlift mission for which it was designed—that is, the rapid deployment of outsized Army equipment and the troops necessary to operate that equipment.

So, the ultimate yardstick is not in the first part of our basic statement: "the C-5 was developed"—but, rather, in the second part: "for a particular job in support of this Nation's military strategy." And, the airplane is doing the job all over the world.

Last March, one of the airplanes lifted three large helicopters to Vietnam and returned with three other battle-damaged ones in a 72-hour round trip. Because the C-5 makes disassembly unnecessary, the choppers were flying missions in Vietnam within 10 hours of arrival. It used to take three C-133s, eight days and an extensive assembly time to get them in the air. In a single mission, one C-5 delivered 22 of the Army's light observation helicopters.

Elsewhere, the Republic of China had an urgent need for a turbine generator located in England. Surface transportation wasn't responsive enough. This was the only airplane in the world that could do the job—and the C-5 did it at the request of the State Department in 30 hours—London to Taiwan.

We used three C-5s to transport an airborne helicopter mine-sweeping unit from Norfolk to the Sixth Fleet. That entailed moving four CH-53 choppers, mine-sweeping devices and the people to use them.

One of our aircraft picked up a complete mobile radar approach control (RAPCON) unit in California and delivered it to Tempelhof Airport, West Berlin. Before the C-5, we would have needed two airplanes and considerable disassembly.

Frequently, we fly cargo too large for other aircraft. We have even flown cargo too large for other modes of transportation. We hauled a Navy sonar dome from Akron, Ohio, to California, because it was too large for truck or rail transport and the boat trip down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers could have taken two months, as well as posing road closing problems.

So, it's been doing a great job for the Department of Defense in carrying the outsized cargo—but its primary mission is combat airlift. You can believe it's been tested hard on that point in the last month—and has performed in a superior manner. When the Communist offensive began early last month, the C-5 was called on to do the job it was designed to do—provide direct support to the military forces. In less than six weeks, we have flown over one hundred C-5 missions into the war zone—and we're doing what we were expected to do. For the most part, we're delivering outsized, heavy equipment that only the C-5 can carry.

For example, C-5s have moved two M-48 battle tanks into South Vietnam; that's 96 tons of tanks, plus associated gear, in each airplane. I mentioned the super off-load times of the birds carrying the slightly smaller M-41 medium tanks.

Add to those several hundred tons of mixed loads of trucks, artillery pieces, vans and the ever-present choppers—and you have some idea of the magnitude of the job we're doing with this airplane.

Rapid Deployment

But let me superimpose another task on the already sizeable operation I just described. Our plans call for us to be able to deploy our land and air forces rapidly throughout the world. In the past, we have exercised and worked hard to achieve a high level of proficiency, getting ready to respond. We had a chance to show our stuff when the decision was made to move the 49th Tactical Fighter Wing from Holloman AFB, New Mexico, to Takhli, Thailand—four fighter squadrons plus a SAC tanker squadron. We put together the team—the C-5 and the C-141—and the commercial carriers who handle most of our passenger requirements—and in nine days we had moved over 4,000 tons—an entire wing

of people and equipment from the States to Southeast Asia.

In contrast—remember Korea in 1951—when it took *56 days* to get the first ground forces from the United States into the conflict. Even today, a shipload of tanks has a steaming time from our West Coast to Vietnam in excess of 25 days—and that is port to port, not Army camp to battlefield.

While the magnitude of this entire Southeast Asia operation is starting to sink in, let me tell you we kept our commitments to our other forces around the world. The C-5 has a role in that, too—albeit a minor one.

Strategic Mobility

So, the airplane has been doing the kind of job it was procured to do—it's doing it today, not some time in the future. To understand fully just what this means to our Nation—not only in Southeast Asia, but all over the world—is to understand what the airplane means for strategic mobility, and what strategic mobility means for national policy and national security.

C-5 SETS RECORD

A U.S. Air Force Galaxy recently set a C-5 record when it flew 8,019 statute miles nonstop from Kadena AB, Okinawa to Charleston AFB, S.C. The 437th Military Airlift Wing crew was in the air 16 hours and 5 minutes, and had enough fuel left for an additional two-hour flight. Col. Willum Spillers, aircraft commander, said the C-5 averaged a ground speed of over 500 miles per hour during the flight.

President Richard Nixon provides us with a starting point. You may recall his words before Congress last September when he spoke to the challenges of peace which need to be addressed as the challenges of war are diminishing. There is no question as to how important our airlift force is to the successful meeting of the challenges of war, that's what I've been telling you about.

The President indicates the chips are also down in a different way—the challenge of peace. We in the military have the same responsibility to stay geared for the possible contingency. That's our responsibility. But our national leadership also has a responsibility to take a deep look at our Nation's priorities—where the Nation is heading [and] the best way to get there.

We understand the reordering of priorities, the distribution of our national resources—more to the solution of domestic problems [and] less to defense. Our challenge is great. We must enhance the quality, responsiveness and the power of the military forces we retain. The evolving military strategy places great dependence upon mobility—the right kind of mobility—rapid, reliable, responsive.

At this point, let me remind you that we—American citizens—have invested in military aircraft required to do only the airlift tasks our commercial carriers cannot practicably perform. They—who comprise the unmatched American civil air industry—are our partners in peace and war through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Our relationship makes efficient and effective use of a national resource.

(Official U.S. Air Force Photos)

"The C-5 will fulfill the strategic airlift mission for which it was designed—that is, the rapid deployment of outsized Army equipment and the troops necessary to operate that equipment."

Flexible Response Strategy

Our flexible response strategy would not be practical if it were necessary to station large garrisons of American fighting forces all over the world. Strategic airlift can give us the means to find the best *mix* of overseas garrisons—prepositioning—and mobility, enabling us to reduce our overseas forces to a level we can better support—and still meet our commitments. Whereas in the past, airlift forces were geared to support policy and strategy already in effect, our partnership now provides an airlift capability that gives our planners and strategists new options—options that can have a growing influence on the development of policy and strategy.

So, you can see—and, even more important, a potential adversary can see—how we are able to exploit the speed and reliability of aircraft to reduce the national investment in defense—and still strike faster, hit harder, and keep the peace through balanced deterrence. We couldn't do this without the C-5. That makes it quite a machine. If you don't believe it, ask the man who owns one!

ARMED FORCES INITIATIVES

DOMESTIC ACTION. Seven Navy Seabee Domestic Action teams are working in the six territory districts of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Primary job of the groups is the training of islanders. Each 13-man Seabee team spends six-months teaching plumbing, carpentry, heavy equipment operations, and engine mechanics, and providing islanders a working knowledge of electricity. One team made a lasting impression on the island of Kusaie by rebuilding a fire-damaged school, finishing a dispensary in the village of Tefunsak, constructing a 250-foot seawall to support a new dispensary at Utwa, building a new concrete slab bridge on the main road, and, with Navy Community Relations funds, constructing the island's first concrete basketball/volleyball court in the village of Lelu. The Seabees also helped finish the last nine and one half miles of road connecting the two ends of the island.

ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE — "The Marine Corps Is Looking For a Few Good Men" and to assure that it gets them—and women—the Corps is conducting a youth fitness program in the Onslow County School System near Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The program was initiated in February; approximately 25 Marines visited local schools and supervised athletic events (photo). To those students who scored at or above 85 percent in all seven events for their age group, the Marines awarded a Presidential certificate plus a cloth emblem.

(Official U.S. Marine Corps Photo)

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. Darkness will no longer be a cover for an enemy, thanks to the continuing development and use of the Star-Light scope (photo) developed by the U.S. Army Electronics Command at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. This AV/PVS-2A night vision device uses only the light of the moon or starlight reflected from the target to produce its image. It is designed for use on the M14 and M16 rifles, M60 machine gun, M67 90mm recoiless rifle, M72 rocket launcher and the M79 40mm grenade launcher. Additional testing is being conducted by the U.S. Army Infantry Board at Ft. Benning, Georgia.

(Official U.S. Army Photo)

DOMESTIC ACTION. Low income farmers in a four-county area around Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, are going to be growing pickles in the near future, thanks to assistance by members of the 95th Civil Affairs Group from the fort. The program is part of a two-year effort by the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service and North Carolina State University to help farmers boost their incomes by diversifying their crops. The Extension Service asked the Food and Agricultural Function Team of the 95th to help because of a shortage of Extension Agents. Two enlisted men with an agricultural background will attend a training program on cucumber culture administered by North Carolina State University before going into the field to help. Also in the works for the future is a swine husbandry program now being developed by the Ft. Bragg team that will be aimed at starting swine herds with a minimum investment.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. A Military Airlift Command Anti-hijacking Program was tested from September to December 1971 at Travis Air Force Base, California, and McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey. An Electro-Search Walk-Through Detector proved to be both reliable and thorough—so much so that it was catching people walking through with coins, cigarettes and gum wrapped in aluminum foil, metal combs, and the like. Passengers had to put their personal belongings in plastic bags which were passed around the machine. Although no one was caught trying to sneak through with a gun or knife, passengers at Travis AFB turned over 12 handguns, five shoulder weapons and three knives to local Security Police before walking through the detector. At McGuire AFB, 125 switchblade knives were relinquished to Security Police. Based on the program's success, one additional detector will be installed at Travis and McGuire AFBs and one each at McChord AFB, Washington, Norton AFB, California, Charleston AFB, South Carolina, and Dover AFB, Delaware.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
Price 5 cents (single copy). Subscription Price: $2.50 per year; $2.00 additional for foreign mailing.
☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 483/788/V-52